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Abstract
This paper examines the dynamics of the shadow economy in times of financial crises.
First, we estimate the size of the shadow economy in nine developing countries using
energy consumption as a proxy for total economic activity. We show that our proposed
proxy performs better than the conventional proxy of electricity consumption. In ad-
dition, given that financial crises usually overlap; a fact that is overlooked by existing
literature, we construct a zero-one index to measure the intensity of a given shock. To ex-
plain the shadow economy impact of financial crises, we employ a set of country-specific
VAR models and exploit their impulse responses. To this end, the paper finds empirical
evidence of the countercyclical behaviour of the shadow economy, which suggests its
buffering role in time financial crises. We show that our results are not sensitive to the
method used to measure the size of the shadow economy. Finally, we build on these
results to draw some policy recommendations.
Keywords: Financial Crisis, Shadow Economy, Developing Countries
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1. Introduction
Many development economists believe that a considerable portion of economic activities
in developing countries is taking place off records (Schneider and Enste, 2000; Eilat
and Zinnes, 2002; Macias and Cazzavillan, 2009; Lesica, 2011)1. However, their claims
∗Corresponding author: Hany Abdel-Latif, 208 School of Management, Swansea University, Bay Campus
SA1 8EN.
Email address: h.abdel-latif@swansea.ac.uk (Hany Abdel-Latif)
1Figures reported in Pratap and Quintin (2006), for instance, show that although the size of the shadow
economy varies greatly among nations, it represents 25 to 80 percent of official GDP in developing countries,
compared to 10 to 15 percent in most developed nations. Shadow economic activities include, but are not
limited to, house production, street vendors and even illegal activities such as drug dealing.
have never been rigorously proven, mainly due to a failure to measure what is meant to
remain in the shadow (Arby et al., 2010)2. Despite this, researchers and policy makers
have shown a great deal of interest in understanding the unseen part of the economy,
claiming that it has a distorting impact from a policy standpoint (Georgiou, 2007). This
interest has increased significantly since the eruption of the recent financial and economic
crises. More particularly, these crises have put forward questions such as how both sides
of the economy interact over business cycles, and what would be the appropriate policy
response in times of financial turbulence. There is ample evidence of the fact that finan-
cial crises have a negative impact on official output. In times of crisis, unemployment
rises and workers may be forced to move to the informal sector. Also, restricted access to
bank credit during financial crises may push more firms into the informal sector than in
normal times (Thomas, 1992; Colombo et al., 2012). Therefore, this paper investigates
the dynamics of the shadow economy in times of financial crisis. More particularly, it
examines whether the shadow economy acts as a transmission channel for financial
shocks, or it can play a buffering role in times of crisis.
Thus, our objective in this paper is twofold. Firstly, the size of the shadow economy in
a number of developing countries is estimated for a forty year period (1971-2011). We
employ an augmented version of the modified total activity MTA method introduced
by Eilat and Zinnes (2002). In response to critiques facing studies using electricity con-
sumption as a proxy for total economic activity, we show that energy consumption might
be a better proxy. Our second objective is to investigate the underground response to
financial shocks. To proxy for financial shocks, we construct an index that takes the value
of zero if there is no crisis, and the value of one if the crisis is very severe. For estimation
purposes, we employ a VAR model for each country separately and exploit its impulse
response function.
To this end, the current study makes a genuine contribution to the literature from several
aspects. First, using an improved methodology, this study contributes to the literature
on measuring the shadow economy by providing updated estimates as they pertain
to a number of developing countries. Second, we introduce an in-depth analysis of
the shadow economy dynamics in times of financial crisis, suggesting a channel of
transmission that has been, so far, overlooked in the existing literature. Finally, this
study contributes to the limited, however growing, literature studying the dynamics of
the shadow economy over business cycles. This contribution to the literature is based
on the fact that only very few studies have examined the effect of financial crises on
the size of the shadow economy, especially after the incidence of the global financial crisis.
This study is important to policy makers in developing countries for at least the fol-
lowing reasons: While policy makers design strategies intended to repress the shadow
economy in order to mitigate its distortion to development policies, these strategies may
‘unintentionally’ play a destructive role in time of crises, if the expansion of the shadow
economy is temporary and therefore can act as a buffer to the shock. In the latter case,
policies that repress the shadow economy may hinder one of the mechanisms by which
2The unrecorded economy has appeared in the literature under various names. In this paper, we will use
the terms shadow economy and underground economy interchangeably to refer to the same thing.
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the economy has a chance to absorb the shock3. In contrast, if the shadow economy
response to financial crises is procyclical or if it expands persistently, then it would not
be advisable to relax the anti-shadow regulations in times of financial crisis. Therefore,
it is imperative and informative to examine whether the shadow economy response is
procyclical or countercyclical and if this response persists over time, or is short-lived.
The remainder of this study consists of the following sections: Section 2 reviews the liter-
ature. Section 3 discusses our empirical strategy and the dataset. Finally, the empirical
results and conclusion are presented in sections 4 and 5, respectively.
2. Literature review
A relevant strand of literature is concerned with the cyclical behaviour of the shadow
economy; i.e., whether it is procyclical or countercyclical. The former concept refers to
a larger shadow economy in times of boom, while in times of bust a smaller shadow
economy will exist. However, the latter suggests the opposite, while the shadow size
flourishes in recessions, it shrinks in peak times. In fact, economic theory explains the
business cycles properties of the shadow economy as the final outcome of income effect
and substitution effect (Bajada, 1999, 2003; Elgin, 2012). While income effect implies that
negative shocks to an economy will affect both sides of that economy, and hence lends
support to the procyclicality behaviour of the shadow economy, the substitution effect
indicates that laid-off formal workers in response to the shock- will be enticed to go
underground, which legitimises the countercyclicality assumption4.
Although, theoretically speaking, it may appear unclear whether the shadow economy is
procyclical or countercyclical, empirical research suggests that it tends to display a coun-
tercyclical adjustment, i.e. backing the substitution hypothesis. Using a VAR modelling
approach, Fiess et al. (2010) have reported similar patterns in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia
and Mexico. Loayza and Rigolini (2011) find that shadow employment plays a temporary
safety net role when it negatively co-moves over the business cycle. Elgin (2012) uses
the shadow economy estimates from Schneider et al. (2010) to examine the informal
sector behaviour over the business cycles. The author finds evidence towards the coun-
tercyclical nature of the underground economy, where the presence and volatility of the
underground sector amplifies the magnitude of the business cycles. Using this finding,
the paper interprets the higher amplitude of business cycles in developing countries
with a large shadow economy. C¸ic¸ek and Elgin (2011) build their empirical analysis on
the idea that the shadow economy exhibits a countercyclical pattern5. Work by Bajada
and Schneider (2005); Schneider and Enste (2000); Feld and Schneider (2010) supports
3We understand that the movement from the official economy to the shadow economy may have adverse
implications on total productivity. However, holding other things equal, when official economy becomes
incapable to produce productive jobs, less productive jobs may be more preferred from policy point of view
compared to no jobs at all.
4Another way to interpret the procylcicality behaviour of the shadow economy is suggested by Elgin (2012),
who states that in times of negative shock, while less productive businesses which operate in the shadow are
perfect candidates to shut down, those businesses in the official economy are more likely to survive thanks to
their relatively higher level of productivity.
5In Australia, the findings of Bajada (1999, 2003) support the procyclicality of the underground economy.
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the expansion of the shadow economy in times of recession. Roca et al. (2001) conclude
that lower wage premium in the official economy triggers expansion in the underground
economy, which leads to larger fluctuations in the official economy. In addition, Vaillant
et al. (2014) and Lee and Ofreneo (2014) examine the underground adjustments in tough
times. Vaillant et al. (2014) find that after growth was hit hard by a political crisis in
Madagascar in 2004, the informal sector has proved to be a labour-absorbing function.
Lee and Ofreneo (2014) study the Asian labour markets adjustments in two crisis times;
Asian crises and global financial crises. They find that labour markets continue to be
characterised by informal, vulnerable and precarious employment, even in recovery
times.
None of the extant literature has explicitly investigated the effect of financial crises on the
size of the underground economy as we do in this study. The only exception is Colombo
et al. (2016), who study the impact of two different types of financial crisis; banking and
currency crises, measured as a dummy variable to identify periods of shocks. However,
our study differs from theirs in the way we model financial crises. More particularly,
while we construct a zero-one index to proxy for the intense of the shock, they merely
rely on the incidence of a shock using a dummy variable ignoring the fact that financial
crises usually overlap. Keeping this in mind, what type of financial crisis should one be
interested in? Even if one decides to compare the shadow response to each crisis, there
is no way to explain the overlapping of two or more crises. In addition, while they use
electricity consumption to proxy for total economic activity which is heavily criticised,
we employ energy consumption in an attempt to respond to those critiques.
To this end, this review of the literature shows that, apart from the study by Colombo
et al. (2016) which we deviate from, there is a strong need for more empirical evidence
on the shadow economy adjustments of financial crises, the main objective of this study.
3. Methodology and Data
The underground economy is a phenomenon that could be, and in fact has been, studied
under plenty of names, including the ‘shadow’, ‘unrecorded’, or ‘informal’ economy; the
list is endless. So far, the present study has intentionally made no attempt to engaging
the long lasting debate on defining what the term ’underground’ actually means. The
reason is that we do not wish to get bogged down in a discussion on how legitimate
these definitions are, which will certainly distract our attention away from the main
focus of this study. In addition, the existence of fine surveys of literature defining the
shadow, such as Schneider (2012), obviates the need for a comprehensive review here.
Yet, measuring the underground economic activities has to start with a satisfactory
identification of what is being under the spotlight. For this purpose, we define the
underground economy as all economic activities which contribute to the economy but
with no means of being detected under the official GDP umbrella. Thus, it encompasses
They show that negative shocks in the official economy have a greater effect on the underground economy
than do positive shocks, which implies that the underground economy may deepen economic downturns and
increase the volatility of the business cycle. A similar pattern is found by Giles (1997) in New Zealand.
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not only legitimate but also unlawful activities, such as the production and distribution
of drugs. The precedent definition has been adopted by a number of studies, see for
example Feige (1989) and Lubell et al. (1991). According to this definition, the shadow
economy includes monetary and non-monetary transactions. What is more, available
estimates of the shadow economy do not usually disentangle legal from illegal activities,
and thus we follow their foot steps. In part, this is so as not to fall into a ‘quantitative
nightmare’ as described by Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2014). Rather, we prefer to focus on a
broader definition of the underground economy, which goes hand in hand with our aim
of contributing to the literature on the underground impact of financial shocks, which
has so far overlooked the effects of such events on the dynamics of the shadow economy.
Bearing this in mind, we first elucidate the modified total economic activity method MTA
proposed by Eilat and Zinnes (2002) to estimate the size of the underground economy.
Then, we lay out the framework by which this study is bounded, and introduce our
empirical strategy.
3.1. Modified total economic activity MTA approach
As is the case with all known methods of measuring the shadow economy, the physical in-
put method of measuring the size of the shadow economy is not immune to criticism. The
major issue with the latter method is the empirical stability of the energy-consumption
to GDP ratio, which may cause a downward bias on the ground of energy-saving tech-
nological changes. To counter this problem, Eilat and Zinnes (2002) suggest running a
regression of electricity consumption against several possible influence variables. These
variables include demand changes due to percentage change in electricity prices to cap-
ture price changes and percentage-point change in industry share of GDP to capture
changes in the structure of output. We follow their modified total economic activity
MTA method to estimate the size of the shadow economy in the countries of interest.
However, we go against their assumption of electricity consumption being the best
single measure of economic activity, and accept that not all of the underground activities
rely on electricity. Thus, rather than using electricity consumption as a proxy of total
economic activity, we use energy consumption which in fact includes besides electricity
consumption all other sources of energy. To explain the MTA method, we start off with
the following equation.
∆enci,t = αi + β1∆enpi,t + β2∆indi,t + i,t (1)
where t = 1972, 1974, . . . , 2011 and i = 1, 2, . . . , 9 which are time and country indexes,
∆enc is the annual percentage changes in energy consumption, ∆enp is the real price of
energy and ∆ind is the industrial value added to GDP. The main idea here is to filter
out the energy consumption data by removing the effects of other factors beside the
changes in total economic activity that could explain changes in energy use. To do
so, the MTA exploits the residuals obtained from Eq.1. Given the relatively long time
dimension of our dataset, the panel co-integration techniques are used to estimate Eq. 1.
Section 3.2 provides more details about the estimation technique. After estimating Eq. 1
and obtaining the residuals ∆encresid, we compute the predicted percentage changes in
total economic activity ∆TEAt by multiplying the ∆residt values by an appropriate output
elasticity (η = 0.90). Finally, we use theses figures converted into a decimal to compute
the TEAt series relative to its 1972 value by chain-multiplication.
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3.2. Panel cointegration
To estimate Eq.1, we first test for the stationarity of our panels using Hardi LM (Hadri,
2000). Then, we test for the presence of cointegrating relationships using two tests of
panel cointegration, namely Pedroni (1999, 2004) and Westerlund (2007) tests. Finally, if
found cointegrated, we estimate Eq. 1 using the group-mean panel fully modified ordi-
nary least squares (GM-FMOLS) method proposed by Pedroni (2001). The GM-FMOLS
estimator allows for the heterogeneity of the panel, adjusts for the effects of autocorrela-
tion of the errors, and adjusts for the potential long-term endogeneity of the regressors. In
this estimator, the impact of the cross-section dependence is captured through common
time effects. It provides a consistent and efficient estimation of the cointegrating vector,
in particular where non-stationarity, endogeneity and serial correlation problems are
suspected.
3.3. VAR model
This study utilises a multivariate VAR model to study the dynamics of the shadow econ-
omy in response to financial shocks. Our selection of empirical method is justified on
the basis of two reasons. First, when studying the shadow economy and its dynam-
ics, endogeneity biases may emerge (Gomis-Porqueras et al., 2014), which makes the
VAR modelling approach a reasonable choice as it does not assume exogeneity of the
regressors. Thus, each variable is treated symmetrically and feedback is allowed for
among all variables. Second, the VAR modelling approach is known to be superior to
a single-equation modelling in capturing the long-run dynamics of the variables. Our
m-variate VAR(p) model can be represented as follows.
Yt = β0 +
p∑
i=1
βiYt−p + ut (2)
where Yt are (m × 1) victor of endogenous variables, namely the size of the shadow
economy, GDP and crisis index. β0 is a (m × 1) vector of the deterministic component,
i.e., intercept. βi is an (m × m) matrix and p is the lag order. Finally, ut are (m × 1) of the
white noise errors. The choice of the number of lags is made on the basis of AIC and
SIC information criteria. The number of lags is set to 1 or 2 whichever provides serially
uncorrelated residuals, according to the autocorrelation function of the VAR residuals.
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller test is used to detect for the presence of unit roots. Also,
we test for the stability of the model by making sure that all AR roots lie within the unit
circle. Finally, we employ the impulse response innovation to stimulate a 1SD shock to
the crisis variable and report the responses of GDP and the size of the shadow economy.
3.4. Data
Our dataset includes data for nine middle income countries over the period 1971-2011.
These countries are Argentina, Brazil, China, Ecuador, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines,
Thailand and Turkey. We first estimate the size of the underground economy in this set
of countries using the MTA method explained in section 3.1. To obtain the size of the
underground economy according the MTA method, we have used the following data:
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Energy consumption enc is the kilogram of oil equivalent of energy use per constant PPP
GDP. This includes electricity consumption as well as other sources of energy. The data
comes from the International Energy Agency. The enc accounts for the domestic produc-
tion of energy, stock changes and international trade. Energy price enp was constructed
for individual countries by deflating the world index of energy by the country specific
consumer price indexes. World index of energy is the relative energy prices were proxied
by this global index of real energy prices. The data for this index comes from the World
Bank- Commodity Price Data. Consumer price index CPI is individual country CPI series
are extracted from Datastream (Hits: AGYCP009F, BRY..NECE, CHRP...., EDWD0O8IF, MYWD0O8IF,
MXWD0O8IF, PHWD0O8IF, THWD0O8IF, TKWD0O8IF). Industry share of GDP ind is the industrial
value added as a percentage of the country’s GDP. Data are extracted from the World
Bank-World Development Indicators database. Official GDP: data comes from the World
Bank World Development Indicators in current value of the PPP US dollar. For our
purpose of calculating the size of the underground economy, these were transformed to
their constant values using 1972 as the base year. In order to obtain the series of the size
of the underground economy as a percentage of the country GDP, it was essential to rely
on a base year of the underground economy. These figures were obtained from the model
based estimates available in Elgin and Oztunali (2012). Although it is important the
credibility of the base year estimate, we do not think it should present much concern for
us, because we use the growth rate in our empirical strategy. We follow in this Colombo
et al. (2016) who state that using any estimation for the base year would not cause any
issues as long as we use the growth rate to examine the dynamics of the shadow economy.
To obtain the empirical results presented in section 4, we have used the following data:
Underground size yt: which is based on our estimates according to the MTA method. In
section 4, we briefly present our estimates of the size of the underground economy. GDPt
data come from the World Bank WDI database, measured in real terms of 2005 prices and
is log-transformed. Financial crisis index crisist: is an index that takes the value of zero if
there is no crisis, and takes the value of one if the crisis was very severe. This index is
constructed based on a simple unweighted average of the 0-1 identification of different
types of financial crisis which is published in the popular Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)
dataset. They document six types financial crises. These are currency crises, inflation
crises, stock market crash, sovereign debt crises (domestic and external), and banking
crises. In fact, their crisis identification shows that financial crises are more likely to
overlap. Argentina and Brazil, for example, experienced five financial crises (all the
above crises except a stock market crash) in 2002 and 1990, respectively. This highlights
the fact that relying on a single financial shock might be misleading as it will be mixed
with the effect of other financial crises that happened in the same time. For this reason,
we believe that our constructed index will be more successful at capturing the intensity
of the shock rather than merely the shock incidence. However, it should be noted that
our index should be treated as an ordinal measure in which data on the intensity of the
shock can be sorted with no indication of the relative degree of difference between them.
For example, an index score of 0.66 indicates a shock that is more intense compared to
another shock with a score of 0.33, without necessarily being twice as severe as the second
case. This means that a crisis which is both a banking and a currency crisis should not be
considered twice as severe as a banking crisis only. However, the overlapping between
both crises is expected to result in a more severe shock compared to the incidence of only
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one shock, which is captured by our proposed index. As a robustness check, we will use
the 0-1 dummy of Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) dataset for banking crises (see section 4.3).
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for our dataset.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Shadow 369 39.8746 13.0234 23.1407 78.0900
Crisis 369 0.2387 0.2472 0.0000 1.0000
GDP 369 25.8262 1.2493 23.1493 29.0652
Bank 369 0.2195 0.4145 0.0000 1.0000
Shadow is our estimated size of the shadow economy using the MTA method based on energy consumption.
Crisis is our 0-1 proposed index that capture the severity of a financial shock. GDP is the log of GDP. Bank is a
dummy variable for banking crises as published in Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) dataset which we use as part of
our robustness checks in section 4.3.
4. Empirical Results
As shown in section 3, our empirical strategy comprises estimating the size of the
shadow economy using an augmented version of the MTA method. For this reason, we
employed panel cointegration technique to estimate Eq. 1 in order to filter out the energy
consumption. Then, we employ a VAR model to examine the response of the shadow
economy to financial crises in each country in our dataset. Thus, in what follows we first
discuss the estimation of the shadow economy, then we discuss the impulse response
functions from our VAR models.
4.1. Estimating the shadow economy
4.1.1. Panel stationarity results
Table 2 reports the results of Hadri (2000) panel root test, which is designed for testing
for stationarity in heterogeneous panels. The results shown in Table 2 reject the null
hypothesis 6. Therefore, we proceed to examine the cointegrating relations among our
variables.
4.1.2. Panel cointegration results
With non-stationary pooled time series, the application of the OLS estimator may result
in biased and inconsistent estimates (Granger and Newbold, 1974; Engle and Granger,
1987). Thus, to decide on an appropriate estimator for Eq. 1, it is important to test for
cointegration among the variables. We test for the presence of cointegration relationships
between ∆enc, ∆enp and ∆ind using the residual-based procedure developed by Pedroni
(1999, 2004) as well as a set of panel cointegration tests developed by Westerlund (2007).
The null hypothesis for both tests is that there is no cointegration. The results for the
cointegration tests are reported in Tables 3 and 4. These results show that we strongly
reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, which implies that it is important to use
the panel cointegration techniques to estimate Eq. 1.
6We also applied the ADF unit root test to individual series and found that a significant portion of series
has unit root. Results are not sown here but available upon request.
8
Table 2: Hadri panel stationarity test
assumption Zµ Zτ
enc Homo 2.971*** 2.535***
enc Hetero 3.887*** 2.535***
enc S erDep 1.847** 3.185***
enp Homo 3.71*** 5.313***
enp Hetero 3.910 *** 3.433***
enp S erDep 0.069 1.178
ind Homo -0.123 0.437
ind Hetero 0.584 0.801
ind S erDep 0.186 1.93**
; H0 : All 9 time series in the panel are stationary processes; Lag selection: fixed
at 1; τ individual linear trend; The statistics are asymptotically distributed as a
standard normal with left hand side rejection area; ∗ ∗ ∗ .
Table 3: Pedroni residual-based cointegration test
Statistics intercept time trend
Within
panel-v 0.629 -1.569
panel-ρ -11.855*** -9.752***
panel-PP -12.769*** -14.403***
panel-ADF -6.293*** -6.664***
Between
group-ρ -9.723*** -7.242***
group-pp -13.732*** -13.966***
group-ADF -5.967*** -5.231***
; H0 : No cointegration; Trend assumption: heterogeneous intercepts; Lag
selection: fixed at 1. Not that all reported values are asymptotically dis-
tributed as standard normal. Panel statistics are weighted by long vari-
ances. The Pedroni tests are left-sided. A ∗ ∗∗ indicates the rejection of the
null hypothesis of no cointegration at the 1 per cent level of significance.
Table 4: Error-correction based cointegration tests
Statistic Value Z-value P-value
Gt -3.561 -3.685 0.000
Ga -20.644 -2.869 0.002
P − t -10.403 -3.925 0.000
P − a -20.867 -4.607 0.000
H0 : no cointegration; Lag selection: fixed at 1; individual linear trend in-
cluded.
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4.1.3. Panel estimation
Since the panel cointegration tests suggest the presence of cointegrating relations among
our variables, we employ the MG-FMOLS estimation of Pedroni (2001) for cointegrated
panels. The results presented in Table 5 show that estimated coefficients are significant
and with the expected sign. This suggests that our approach has successfully filtered out
the effect of price and technology changes. Thus, we obtain the residuals and follow the
procedure described in section 3 to obtain the estimates of the shadow economy.
Table 5: Cointegrated panel estimation MG-FMOLS
No trend with trend
∆enp -0.045*** -0.055**
∆ind 0.323*** 0.255***
Mean group fully modified OLS estimator of Pedroni (2001)
for cointegrated panels. Estimation includes a constant and
one lag
First, to show that the newly proposed proxy, namely overall energy use, for estimating
the size of the underground economy, is superior over the incumbent, namely electricity
use, we do the following: (i) establish that the proposed proxy is econometrically better
than the existing one, by showing that its elasticity with respect to national income is
closer to one than that of the existing proxy; (ii) estimating the size of the informal sector
by using the existing proxy and comparing the results obtained by each of the proxies;
the latter should give some sense of the importance of distinguishing between the two
proxies. Therefore, we first estimate energy and electricity elasticities with respect to the
national income using the MG-FMOLS estimator. The dependent variable is GNI, while
the independent variable is the underlying proxy, both expressed in the logarithmic
form. Results reported in Table 6 show that our proposed proxy entertains a closer to one
elasticity when compared to the conventional electricity consumption proxy. Moreover,
Figure 1 shows the estimation for the size of the shadow economy according to using
both proxies, energy consumption and electricity consumption. This evidence supports
the importance of distinguishing between the two proxies. More specifically, the electric-
ity consumption proxy tends to overestimate the size of the shadow economy.
Table 6: Energy and electricity consumption elasticities
constant constant and trend
energy 1.107*** 0.639***
electricity 0.728*** 0.464***
Mean group fully modified OLS estimator of Pedroni (2001) for cointegrated panels.
Estimation includes a constant and one lag
Second, to gauge the relevance of our filtering approach, we compare our estimates of
the size of the underground economy with those of Elgin and Oztunali (2012), who use a
two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model to estimate the shadow economy, see Fig.
1. As can be seen from the graph, using the Elgin and Oztunali (2012) estimation as a
base year, both estimates show a downward tendency of the shadow size. As explained
10
Figure 1: Shadow economy estimation by different methods
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earlier, using a base year should not cause much concern as we use the growth rate when
empirically examining the dynamics of the shadow economy. However, the use of a base
year here was merely for comparison purposes.
4.2. Shadow response to financial shocks
4.2.1. Estimating VAR model
First, we test the unit root properties of our variables in level using the ADF test. Results
reported in Table 7 show that we failed to reject the ADF null hypothesis of unit root
for most of our series. Thus, we performed the test on the data in the first difference.
Results reported in Table 8 show that we reject the null hypothesis of unit root for all
series. Thus, we estimate a VAR model with the variables entering in their first difference.
The appropriate lag length is chosen such that the AIC and SIC information criteria are
minimized. In addition, the stability of the VAR model is confirmed by having all the
inverse roots of the AR process inside the unit circle. To ensure such stability, using one
lag was enough for all countries except in Malaysia where two lags were necessary.
Table 7: ADF unit root test - level
No trend trend
shadow gdp crisis shadow gdp crisis
Argentina 0.423 2.197 -2.511 -3.955** -0.641 -2.751
Brazil -2.598 -2.091 -2.423 -2.280 -2.906* -2.693
China -1.613 1.117 -3.379** -0.729 -4.752*** -3.386**
Ecuador -2.048 -2.443 -2.101 -2.210 -3.910** -1.995
Malaysia -3.613*** -1.880 -4.036*** -2.165 -1.512 -3.962***
Mexico -1.855 -2.707* -2.845* -2.282 -2.833 -3.068
Philippines -2.769* 0.129 -1.971 -2.753 -2.472 -3.344*
Thailand -3.101** -1.965 -2.057 -0.462 -1.048 -3.046
Turkey -0.852 -0.431 -2.495 -0.181 -3.189 -2.500
Table 8: ADF unit root test - first difference
No trend trend
shadow gdp crisis shadow gdp crisis
Argentina -4.461*** -4.841*** -7.441*** -4.970*** -4.986*** -7.394***
Brazil -5.292*** -3.801*** -7.789*** -5.377*** -4.989*** -7.795***
China -4.175*** -4.405*** -7.853*** -4.342*** -4.062*** -7.785***
Ecuador -6.628*** -3.972*** -5.217*** -6.556*** -4.060*** -5.305***
Malaysia -5.078*** -5.298*** -7.434*** -5.801*** -5.528*** -7.433***
Mexico -5.975*** -4.656*** -7.561*** -5.899*** -4.859*** -7.555***
Philippines -5.140*** -3.567** -8.317*** -5.409*** -3.501* -8.246***
Thailand -4.530*** -3.620*** -6.313*** -4.609*** -4.103*** -6.346***
Turkey -5.450*** -6.199*** -6.096*** -6.696*** -6.100*** -6.370***
12
4.2.2. GDP response to financial shocks
We stimulate a 1SD shock to the ‘crisis’ variable and report the impulse responses of the
GDP in each country in our dataset. Figure 2 presents the GDP response to financial
shocks. Two observations can be drawn from figure 2. First, GDP response to financial
shocks is negative and statistically significant in all countries. Second, the GDP takes at
least two years to recover after a financial shock. For example, in Argentina, GDP falls
by 2.5% and 2.8% in the first and second years after the shock, and the shock response
becomes statistically insignificant after the third year. The shock response dies out in
year 4. A similar response is reported for Brazil, where the GDP falls by 1.1% and 1.8%
in years 1 and 2, respectively. In China, the GDP response to financial shocks is less than
it is in Argentina and Brazil, where the Chinese output falls by only 0.8% and 1% in year
1 and 2. However, the Chinese GDP takes about 4 years to achieve recovery. In fact,
Ecuador experiences a similar response to that of the Chinese GDP to financial shocks,
where the response is really low, however, it exists for a longer period of a time. In
particular, the GDP in Ecuador falls by much less than it does in China, 0.2% in the first
year but however it takes almost four years to recover. In Malaysia, the GDP is found to
be much more sensitive to financial shocks as it falls by 1.4% and 3.7% in years 1 and 2,
respectively. However, this response is only significant till year 2. In Mexico, the GDP
falls by 1% and 2.9% in years 1 and 2, and the shock takes about three years to become
statistically insignificant. In the Philippines, the GDP falls by 0.7% and 2% in the first two
years, then it becomes insignificant from the third year onwards. In Thailand, the GDP
falls by 1.6% and 3% in the first two years, and this fall continues to be significant till
year 6. Finally, in Turkey, the GDP falls by 1% and 1.7% in the first two years, however,
this response becomes statistically insignificant three years after the shock.
Figure 2: IRFs - GDP response to financial shocks
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4.2.3. Shadow response to financial shocks
Figure 3 presents the shadow economy response to financial shocks. As expected, the
size of the shadow economy seems to responds positively to financial shocks. Although
this expansion in the shadow economy appears to be statistically significant, it does not
seem to be persistent over time. However, the period of time needed for this expansion
in the shadow economy to die out differs from one country to another. For Argentina, the
shadow economy increases by 0.15% in the first year after the shock and this response
takes about five years to die out. For Brazil, the shadow economy increases by 1% in
the first year, and becomes statistically insignificant after the second year. A similar
response is found for China, where the size of the shadow economy increases by 2% in
the first year, and this expansion is found to be statistically insignificant after the second
year. In Ecuador, the size of the shadow economy increases by 2.5% in the first year
and this response becomes insignificant after the second year. In Malaysia, it seems that
the response of the shadow economy persists for a longer period of time, where the
shock response is not very high (i.e., 0.6%) in the first year. However, it continues to be
significant for at least nine years after the shock. For Mexico, the expansion of the shadow
economy in response to a financial shock is found to be 0.5% in the first two years and
this response becomes statistically insignificant after the second year. In the Philippines,
the shadow economy increases by 0.05% in the first year, however this increase is not
statistically significant. Surprisingly, the response of the shadow economy to financial
shocks seems to be negative in the Philippines where the size of the shadow economy
falls in the second and third years by 0.06% and 0.5, respectively. This drop in the size of
the shadow economy in the Philippines is statistically significant. Despite this, the shock
response becomes insignificant after the third year. In Thailand, the size of the shadow
economy increases by 0.2% in the firs year. The magnitude of this expansion after a
financial shock drops after the first year to become 0.15% and 0.022% in the second and
third years, respectively. This falling trend continues till the fifth year when the shock
response becomes very close to zero and statistically insignificant. Finally, for Turkey,
the shock response of the shadow economy is positive and statistically significant, which
continues till six years after the shock. The expansion in the Turkish shadow economy
after a financial shock is found to be 0.7%, 0.6% in the first two years. This declining
trend continues until the sixth year when the response becomes almost zero.
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Figure 3: IRFs - shadow response to financial shocks
4.3. Robustness checks
So far, we have estimated the size of the shadow economy using the MTA method
based on the energy consumption. Then, utilising the IRFs from a set of country-specific
VAR models, we showed that the shadow economy expands in times of financial crisis.
However, our results may be driven by the estimation of the shadow economy and/or
our measure of financial crises. Therefore, to check the robustness of our findings as
follows. First, we estimate the size of the shadow economy using the MTA method based
on electricity consumption instead of energy consumption and report the IRFs. Results
reported in Fig. 4 confirm our findings wherein the shadow economy tends to increase
in size as a response to a financial shock 7. Second, to make sure that our results are
not influenced by our proposed index of financial crises, we re-estimate the individual
country models using data on banking crises provided by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010).
The estimated IRFs of a one-off shock to the size of the shadow economy show that it
expands after the incidence of a banking crisis, see Fig. 5. Finally, as a further robustness
check, we estimate a panel VAR model of all of the nine countries together instead of the
individual country-specific VAR models (see Fig. 6). Again, the estimated IRF from our
panel VAR model shows that the shadow economy is likely to expand in response to a
financial shock and this expansion does not seem to be persistence over time.
7In addition, we use data on the size of the shadow economy estimated by Elgin and Oztunali (2012) to
produce the IRFs and it confirms our results. Results are note reported here but are available upon request.
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Figure 4: IRFs for the shadow economy (based on electricity consumption)
Figure 5: IRFs for the shadow economy (banking crisis)
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Figure 6: IRFs - Panel VAR estimation
5. Conclusions
This study makes a genuine contribution to the limited literature studying the dynamics
of the shadow economy in times of financial crisis, a topic that is still poorly understood
but important from the policy perspective. To do so, we set out two key objectives. Firstly,
the size of the underground economy in a number of developing countries is estimated
for the period 1971-2011. Secondly, a set of individual country VAR models is built and
their impulse response functions are exploited to address our key question: how does
the shadow economy respond to financial shocks? We use an improved methodology
that is independent from theoretical assumptions and avoids the ad-hoc assumptions that
plague the applications of other methods; i.e, an augmented version of the modified total
activity MTA method. In particular, to proxy for total economic activity, we use energy
consumption in a response to the critiques facing the use of electricity consumption.
We show that our proposed proxy of energy consumption performs better than the
conventional proxy of electricity consumption. In addition, to account for the fact that
financial crises usually overlap, we construct a zero-one index to capture the intensity of
a financial shock. Applying a number of robustness checks, we show that our results
are not sensitive to the method used in measuring the size of the shadow economy or
to our proposed index of financial crises. Our results show that financial shocks have
negative impacts on GDP in all countries. Moreover, in most countries, the shadow
economy appears to behave countercyclically, which implies that it expands in times of
financial crisis. This finding suggests that the shadow economy may play a buffering
role in harsh times. Furthermore, since the expansion of the shadow economy does not
seem to be persistent over time, an important policy implication can be drawn based
upon our empirical results. In particular, we go against the conventional wisdom by
suggesting a lax enforcement of anti-shadow regulations in times of financial crisis.
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